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1 Introduction
Illegal immigration is a perennial problem facing many advanced economies today. In 2014, for example,
more than 276,000 immigrants entered the European Union illegally, a figure likely to soar in the coming
years.1 Across the Atlantic, a conservative estimate is that there are 11.5 million illegal immigrants living in
the United States.2 Concerned that such large flows of illegal immigrants may strain their economies, take
jobs away from workers, and threaten national security, many destination countries have begun to reassess
their immigration policy.3
Destination country governments have two instruments at their disposal to control illegal immigration.
First, they can stop illegal immigrants at the borders before they gain entry. In addition, they can appre-
hend and deport illegal immigrants living within their borders. Following Ethier (1986), we call these two
instruments external and internal enforcement policy, respectively.
There is much empirical literature examining the eﬃcacy of such enforcement policies. For example,
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) and Hanson et al. (2002) analyze the eﬀects of external enforcement policy
on local labor markets around the U.S.-Mexico border. Bohn et al. (2014) and Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman
(2014) examine the eﬀects of recent changes in Arizona’s internal enforcement policy. While these works
study a single destination country/region in isolation, today’s immigration problems often span multiple
destination countries/regions. For example, most immigrants to Europe arrive in Greece or Italy but the
majority of them eventually settle down in Germany or other Northern European countries. As a result,
the “entry” countries and the “settlement” countries do not necessarily agree on E. U. immigration policy;
see, e.g., Casarico et al. (2015). Likewise, there are considerable diﬀerences in attitude towards illegal
immigrants among U.S. states.4
Given such environments, the present paper aims at two objectives. The primary objective is to charac-
terize the eﬀects of immigration policies in the presence of multiple destination countries. Since immigrants
are often blamed for taking jobs away from native workers, our secondary objective is to explore the nexus
1http://humanevents.com/2015/01/19/illegal-immigration-is-europe-losing-control-of-its-borders/
2http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/
3For instance, the European Commission gives immigration issues a central priority (see the European Agenda on Migration,
published on 13 May 2015).
4For example, see the New York Times article by R. C. Archibold entitled “Arizona enacts stronger law on immigration”
(April 23, 2010).
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between immigration policy and unemployment. For this purpose, we first develop a single-country model
of search unemployment featuring illegal immigration, and then extend this “baseline” model to cases with
multiple destination countries.
In the “baseline” model we incorporate illegal immigration into the standard model of equilibrium
unemployment, where all active firms randomly experience job separations due to idiosyncratic adverse
shocks. In our setting, firms employing illegal immigrants can lose workers for another reason: internal
enforcement policy. We find that stronger external enforcement policy curtails immigration flows and lowers
unemployment rates for both native and immigrant workers. Internal enforcement has similar eﬀects, so the
two instruments can be combined optimally to reduce the overall enforcement costs, as in Ethier (1986).
With multiple countries, we face new issues since immigrants can choose where to immigrate. As a more
stringent immigration policy in one country can turn away immigrants towards other destination countries,
there can be policy spillovers among destination countries, giving rise to policy conflict.5 It turns out that
the precise nature of policy spillovers depend on geographical configurations of destination countries with
respect to the source country. While many such configurations are conceivable, we find it useful to focus on
two prototypal cases. In one case, all the destination countries border the (common) source country (we still
assume one source country).6 In such a setting, immigrants can cross the border wherever border control
is the weakest and then move to the preferred destinations, assuming there are no mobility barriers across
destination countries. We call this the “common-border” case. In the second case, only one destination
country borders the source country so that all immigrants must enter this unique border country to reach
other destination countries. We call this the “single-border” case. These two prototypal cases exhibit
distinct properties but also share common features. Once such properties are understood, our analysis can
readily be applied to more realistic geographies involving multiple border and non-border countries.
We now outline the equilibrium outcome in each case. In the common-border case, since the country
with the weakest border control determines flows of immigrants into all the destination countries, we can
apply Hirshleifer’s weakest-link model (Hirshleifer 1983, 1985) to show that the external enforcement (border
5 It is the standard result in the tax competition literature that any policy towards internationally mobile factors has spillovers;
see e.g. Wilson (1999) and Cremer and Pestieau (2004) for a survey on this literature.
6Actually, many illegal immigrants are known to traverse a number of countries before reaching the U.S. or European
borders. Here we ignore the eﬀect of such intermediate countries’ policy towards transitory immigrants.
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control) policy game has a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria.7 If all the destination countries are
symmetric, the equilibrium set contains their most preferred policy vector, and hence there need not be
policy conflict among the destination countries. In contrast, if the destination countries are asymmetric,
their preferred external enforcement levels diverge, resulting in policy conflict. Further, with asymmetric
countries, the Nash equilibrium external enforcement levels fall short of the jointly optimal level, calling for
policy coordination.
In contrast, in the single-border case, where one border country controls flows of immigrants into all
the other destination countries, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the border
country implements its optimal external enforcement policy. However, the other countries prefer tighter
border control. Consequently, we find the equilibrium external enforcement level to be below the joint
optimum.
Although external enforcement policy is ineﬃcient in both prototypal cases, the ineﬃciencies arise for
diﬀerent reasons. In the common-border case, external enforcement is akin to a public good, with the
weakest-link structure giving rise to underprovisions of the public good. By contrast, the ineﬃciency in
the single-border case is ascribed to the standard externalities; the unique border country fails to take into
account the other destination countries’ welfare when implementing its external enforcement policy.
In contrast to external enforcement policy, internal enforcement policy has no spillover eﬀects. In-
tuitively, if one country strengthens its internal enforcement policy, some immigrants may flee to other
destination countries, but the resultant increases in immigrant populations make other destination coun-
tries less desirable for future immigrants. As a result, in steady state the number of illegal immigrants
remain unaﬀected in other destination countries. Our analysis thus implies that external enforcement pol-
icy should best be handled by the federal or supranational government, whereas internal enforcement can
be left up to each destination country’s discretion.
Given the ineﬃciency of external enforcement policy, we next ask how the supranational government
should allocate the cost of external enforcement policy among the asymmetric destination countries. Our
analysis shows that the country with a larger native labor force should bear a greater share of the enforcement
cost. Absent a supranational authority, delegating external enforcement to the larger country (without side
7Bryant (1983) shows that, if final good production depends on the minimum of the intermediate goods produced, then the
model also has a continuum of equilibria.
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payments) increases the joint welfare. These findings hold both in the common-border and the single-border
case. Intuitively, because of constant returns to scale, the aggregate welfare eﬀect of border enforcement
is greater at the margin, the greater the country’s native labor force. This implies that a larger country
prefers to enforce border control more tightly, given symmetric enforcement costs. Hence, the joint welfare
would be greater if border control is delegated to a larger country instead of a smaller country.
We now relate this paper to literature. First, this paper contributes to the line of research initiated by
Ethier (1986). Ethier assumed a small destination country to remove its monopsonistic influence against
the source country so as to focus on the pure eﬀect of immigration policy. Subsequent research expanded
Ethier’s work to other immigration-related issues; see Bond and Chen (1987), Djaji´c (1987), Yoshida and
Woodland (2005), and Woodland and Yoshida (2006), among others.8 This literature usually assumes
unemployment due to wage rigidity (e.g., wages set by minimum wage legislation or labor unions). The
rigid-wage assumption is analytically convenient but is often criticized for its failure to explain how the wage
is set in the first place. In contrast, the wages and the unemployment rates are determined endogenously
in our analysis.9
Mayr et al. (2012), Giordani and Ruta (2013), and Bandyopadhyay and Pinto (2017) considered mul-
tiple destination countries. Mayr et al. (2012), focusing on external enforcement and amnesty policies
in the single-border case, show that total enforcement spending is likely to be ineﬃciently low, which is
consistent with our results from the single-border case. Giordani and Ruta (2013) analyze the common-
border case, limiting their attention, however, only to external enforcement policy by symmetric countries.
Further, their government objective function is not derived from a general equilibrium structure.10 Lastly,
Bandyopadhyay and Pinto (2017) adopt a setting similar to that of Giordani and Ruta (2013), but consider
internal enforcement policy (as well as the provision of local public goods). They find that, for a given
external enforcement policy level, internal enforcement policy levels are too high and public good provisions
are too low relative to the social optima. In their analysis, the ineﬃciency of internal enforcement policy
8These models, including ours, focus on economic incentives to migrate and hence are not suited to analyze recent refugee
problems triggered by wars, political, and religious persecution.
9For models of equilibrium unemployment, see Pissarides (2000) and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005). Carter (1999)
introduces unemployment based on the Stiglitz-Shapiro (1984) eﬃciency-wage hypothesis into the Ethier model.
10On the other hand, Giordani and Ruta (2013) discuss in detail how to use risk dominance to select a unique equilibrium
from the continuum of Nash equilibria, to which we have nothing to add.
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stems from the assumption that immigrant populations are fixed or that destination countries are large to
exert their monopolistic power against the source country. If we impose either assumption in our setting,
the equilibrium internal enforcement policy also becomes ineﬃcient. For example, with large destination
countries, implementation of stronger internal enforcement policy in one country depresses the welfare in
the source country due to its monopsonistic power, as pointed out in Ethier (1986), thereby prompting more
immigration to other destinations. Thus, one contribution of our analysis to this literature is to identify
the channels through which internal enforcement generates spillover eﬀects.
We note, in passing, that the above works have significantly diﬀerent model structures. Giordani and
Ruta (2013) and Mayr et al. (2012) assume standard perfect competitive frameworks, and Bandyopadhyay
and Pinto (2017) consider a discrete choice model, while we employ a model of search unemployment.
Despite these diﬀerences, (in)eﬃciency results are surprisingly robust
In a nutshell, then, our paper subsumes these recent analyses in a unified framework and provides
consistent characterizations of eﬃcient immigration policies in the presence of unemployment. Moreover, our
analysis focuses more on asymmetric cases and addresses the question of who should bear the enforcement
cost. Our results on the optimal allocation of enforcement costs provide new insights to the cost sharing
rule among destination countries. For instance, although the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union requires
the fair sharing of responsibility and cost of implementing immigration policies among member states, “it
does not provide any rule on how to share these costs in practice” (Russo and Senatore 2013). While Russo
and Senatore (2013) analyzed the incentives to share the external enforcement costs, we approach it from
the welfare point of view, studying how cost sharing rule should be.11
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The baseline model of Section 2 extends the Ethier
model to incorporate equilibrium unemployment. Section 3 examines the properties of external and internal
enforcement policy in the baseline model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal immigration policy for a
single small destination country in the baseline model. Section 5 extends the analysis to cases with two
destinations. Section 6 extends the analysis to three countries and to consider mobility of native workers.
Section 7 concludes.
11Chassanboulli and Palivos (2014) place equilibrium unemployment at center stage of their analysis but focus on economic
growth with legal immigration only.
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2 Baseline model: a single destination country
2.1 Model structure
In this section we develop the baseline model, where there is one destination country and one source country.
Let there be Ln native workers and Lm illegal immigrant workers residing in the destination country. Ln
is taken as exogenous while Lm is determined in the equilibrium. If there are legal immigrants in the
destination country, they are considered part of Ln.12
The model features equilibrium unemployment. To keep focus on immigration issues, we adopt the
simplest model structure that gives rise to equilibrium unemployment. The basic tenet of the search-
theoretic approach to unemployment is the absence of organized labor markets. Thus, unemployed workers
and firms with vacancies engage in search activity. Search is uncoordinated, costly, and time-consuming. To
cut through the complexity of search activity, the literature utilizes the matching function, which embodies
the notion that workers and firms are matched randomly in a Poisson process. The matching function works
like a neoclassical production function. First, it exhibits diminishing returns to a “factor.” Holding the
number of job seekers constant, an increase in the number of vacancies makes it more diﬃcult for a firm to
fill its vacancy while making it easier for a job seeker to find a job. This implies that, θ, denoting the ratio
of vacant jobs over unemployed workers, is negatively related to q, the rate at which vacancies are filled
per unit of time, and positively related to s, the rate at which an unemployed worker finds a job per unit
of time. That is, we can write these relations as q = q(θ) and s = s(θ) with the first derivatives given by
q0(θ) < 0 and s0(θ) > 0.13 Second, the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. This implies
that s and q are related by the equation s(θ) = θq(θ).14
The unemployment pool in the destination country contains both native workers and illegal immigrants.
Let α denote the proportion of illegal immigrants in the pool. A firm looking for a worker is matched
randomly with a native (n) or an immigrant (m). After a match, a firm finds whether the new employee is
a native or not and chooses whether to hire that worker or keep searching. In equilibrium, however, a firm
always hires the worker that shows up because of costly search.15
12We do not ask who will be illegal/legal immigrants. Mangin and Zenou (2016) develop a model wherein workers decide
whether or not to illegally migrate.
13Primes denote diﬀerentiation.
14See Pissarides (2000).
15This result that firms have incentive to hire illegal immigrants is consistent with empirical findings. In fact, Brown et
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Let V denote the value of a firm in search of a worker and Ji the value of a firm employing a worker of
type i = n,m. These values are related in the following equation:
rV = −c+ qα(Jm − V ) + q(1− α)(Jn − V ), (1)
where c > 0 is a flow search cost and r is the rate of interest, both exogenously given. The right-hand
side of this equation has the following interpretation. A firm that spends search cost c is matched with an
immigrant at rate qα, and with a native worker at rate q(1−α), per unit of time. A match changes a firm’s
asset value by Jm − V if it is matched with an immigrant and by Jn − V if it is matched with a native.
Thus, the right-hand side of (1) represents the flow value of of search. In equilibrium this is just equal to
rV . Further, free entry drives V to zero in steady state. Setting V = 0 in (1) yields
αJm + (1− α)Jn = c
q
. (2)
Native and immigrant workers are assumed equally productive.16 As a result, every active firm produces
y units of the aggregate good, the numéraire, and pays the wage wi to a worker of type i (= n,m). Further,
all active firms are hit by idiosyncratic adverse shocks, resulting in job separations. Separated firms and
workers engage in search activities once again. Suppose that job separations follow a Poisson process with
rate λ, which is exogenous and common to all active firms. Consider a firm employing a native worker. It
earns the net profit y − wn per unit of time and experiences a job separation at rate λ per unit of time,
resulting in a loss of its value Jn − V = Jn. The right-hand side of the following equation thus measures
the flow value of a firm employing a native worker. In equilibrium, this flow value equals rJn. Hence,
rJn = y − wn − λJn.
Collecting terms yields the firm value:
Jn =
y − wn
r + λ . (3)
A firm employing an immigrant faces the additional risk of losing its worker due to internal enforcement
policy. If an immigrant worker is apprehended at rate δ per unit of time, the value of a firm employing an
immigrant satisfies this asset-value equation:
rJm = y − wm − (λ+ δ)Jm.
al (2013) showed by using administrative data from the state of Georgia that employing illegal immigrants can even yield a
competitive advantage of firms.
16Asymmetry in productivity between natives and immigrants can be introduced but does not aﬀect our qualitative results.
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Collecting terms yields:
Jm =
y − wm
r + λ+ δ . (4)
Now, substituting the firm values from (3) and (4) into (2), we can rewrite the free-entry condition as:
α(y − wm)
r + λ+ δ +
(1− α)(y − wn)
r + λ =
c
q
. (5)
This equation relates the wages to q, the rate at which a firm fills its vacancy.
Following the literature, we assume that the wages are set through the Nash bargaining between a worker
and a firm after a match. The equilibrium wage wi thus maximizes the Nash product (Wi−Ui)p(Ji−V )1−p,
where Wi and Ui denote, respectively, the lifetime welfare value of employment and unemployment for
worker type i = n,m, while the parameter p measures a worker’s relative bargaining power. To keep things
simple, we assume equal bargaining power between a firm and a worker, i.e., p = 1/2.17 This implies that
a firm and a native worker evenly split the joint surplus created by a match, i.e.,
Wn − Un = Jn. (6)
We have already calculated Jn as a function of wn. To calculate Wn−Un, note that, when unemployed,
a native worker finds a job at rate s per unit time, which increases her welfare by Wn − Un. Thus, an
unemployed native worker faces the asset-value function:
rUn = s(Wn − Un).
Similarly, when employed, a native earns the wage wn, but can lose the job at rate λ. As a job loss causes
the welfare loss Un −Wn, the corresponding asset-value equation is given by:
rWn = wn + λ(Un −Wn).
The two asset-value equations can be arranged to yield:
Wn − Un = wn
r + λ+ s. (7)
Finally, substituting from (3) and (7) into (6), we can express the equilibrium wage for a native as a function
of s, the job-finding rate:
wn =
y(r + λ+ s)
2 (r + λ) + s. (8)
17 It may be more realistic to assume that immigrant workers have weaker bargaining power compared with native workers.
Introducing such an asymmetry does not aﬀect our key results qualitatively, however.
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The lifetime welfare of an immigrant can be calculated analogously, except that an immigrant faces
deportation risks at rate δ. If we let W0 denote the value of staying in the source country, an immigrant’s
asset value equations when unemployed and when employed, respectively, are written:
rUm = s(Wm − Um) + δ(W0 − Um),
rWm = wm + λ(Um −Wm) + δ(W0 −Wm).
We assume that the destination country is small relative to the source country. This assumption,
according to Ethier (1986), prevents the destination country from using immigration policy to extract the
monopsony rents from the source country, allowing us to focus on the domestic eﬀects of immigration
policy. The small-country assumption implies that W0 is independent of the destination country’s policy.
To keep calculations simple, we choose the utility unit so as to set W0 = 0. With this “normalization,” an
immigrant’s asset-value equations above yield
Wm =
(r + δ + s)wm
(r + δ)(r + δ + λ+ s) , (9)
Um =
sWm
r + δ + s,
and hence
Wm − Um = wm
r + δ + λ+ s. (10)
Substituting from (4) and (10), we can write the Nash bargaining solution Wm − Um = Jm as:
wm
r + δ + λ+ s =
y − wm
r + λ+ δ ,
which can be arranged to yield:
wm =
y (r + δ + λ+ s)
2(r + λ+ δ) + s . (11)
We next discuss an immigrant’s decision to migrate.18 Let b denote the disutility an immigrant incurs
in an attempt to cross the border. Suppose that all those who try to enter the destination country incurs
the disutility b and get apprehended at the border with probability φ. Apprehended immigrants are sent
back home, while ones who evade apprehension enter the unemployment pool in the destination country.
Thus, an immigrant’s expected welfare from trying to cross the border equals:
−b+ (1− φ)Um + φW0.
18We do not consider immigrants’ location choices within the destination country. For a search theoretic analysis of location
choice within a country/region/city, see Zenou (2009), among others.
10
In an interior equilibrium, this must be equal to W0, the value of staying home. With the normalization
W0 = 0, this equilibrium condition is given by
Um =
b
1− φ . (12)
We next describe the relationships that must hold in steady state. First, the total number of jobs
destroyed per unit of time must equal the total number of jobs created per unit of time. For natives, we
thus have λ(1− un)Ln = sunLn, which yields the equilibrium unemployment rate for natives:
un =
λ
λ+ s. (13)
With the risk of deportation, the corresponding steady state condition for immigrants is given by (λ+δ)(1−
um)Lm = sumLm, and hence immigrants are unemployed at rate:
um =
λ+ δ
λ+ δ + s. (14)
Finally, by the law of large numbers, α equals the actual proportion of immigrants in the unemployment
pool:
α = umLm
umLm + unLn
. (15)
This completes the description of the baseline model.
2.2 Solving the baseline model
We now solve the model. First, substituting from (9) into (12) yields
Um =
sWm
r + δ + s =
b
1− φ .
Substitution for Wm from (9) turns this equation into
swm
(r + δ)(r + δ + λ+ s) =
b
1− φ . (16)
Substituting from (11), we can rewrite (16) as
sy
(r + δ) [2 (r + δ + λ) + s] =
b
1− φ , (17)
which can be solved for the equilibrium s:
s =
2b(r + δ)(r + δ + λ)
(1− φ)y − b(r + δ) . (18)
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To ensure that s > 0, we impose the following two conditions. First, enforcement policy variables φ and δ
are bounded above, having domains [0,φ] and [0, δ¯], respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 around here]
Second, a worker’s productivity y is large enough to satisfy.
Assumption 1: (1− φ)y > b(r + δ¯).
Assumption 1 guarantees that the denominator on the right-hand side of (18) is positive, and hence s > 0,
for all relevant values of φ and δ.
Once the equilibrium value of s is calculated, the remainder of the model can be solved recursively.
Substituting the equilibrium s from (18) into (8) and (11) determines the equilibrium wages wn and wm,
respectively, while substituting s into (13) and (14) determines the equilibrium unemployment rates un and
um, respectively. Inverting the function s(θ) yields the equilibrium θ, determining the equilibrium q = q(θ).
Then, the equilibrium q, un and um can be substituted into (5) for the equilibrium α, the proportion of
unemployed immigrants in the unemployment pool. With the values of α and the two unemployment rates
un and um given, (15) can be used to compute the number of illegal immigrants Lm in the destination
country. Thus, our first result is:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 the model has a unique equilibrium.
Substitution of the equilibrium wages into (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium firm values:
Jn =
y
2 (r + λ) + s, (19)
Jm =
y
2 (r + δ + λ) + s.
A comparison shows that Jn > Jm for all δ > 0; a firm hiring a native has a higher firm value than one
hiring an immigrant, although all workers are equally productive. Similarly, all δ > 0, wn > wm by (8) and
(11) and um > un by (13) and (14).19 Intuitively, since immigrant workers are apprehended and deported,
they lose jobs at a higher rate than natives. And yet, natives and immigrants find jobs at the same rate,
19The firm values, wages and unemployment rates are equalized if and only if δ = 0.
12
s. Thus, in steady state, there are proportionately more unemployed immigrants relative to native workers.
Further, a higher probability of job separation generates a smaller surplus in a match, resulting in a lower
wage for an immigrant and a lower value for a firm that employs an immigrant. These findings are noted in
Proposition 2 For all δ > 0, (i) Jn > Jm; (ii) wn > wm; (iii) um > un.
We next examine how the size of the native labor force aﬀects the size of the immigrant population in
the destination country. To this end, we plug (19) into (2) to obtain
αy
2 (r + δ + λ) + s +
(1− α)y
2 (r + λ) + s =
c
q
.
This equation, combined with (2), shows that the equilibrium value of α is independent of Ln. Moreover,
Ln does not aﬀect um and un, either. Then, equation (15) implies that an increase in Ln only raises Lm.
Thus,
Proposition 3 A larger destination country (in terms of its native labor force Ln) tends to have more
illegal immigrants than a smaller destination country, other things being equal.
Since the native labor force Ln includes the country’s legal immigrants, a destination country that
admits more legal immigrants has a larger Ln compared with a country that admits fewer legal immigrants,
other things being equal. Thus, one implication of Proposition 3 is that illegal immigrants tend to migrate
to a country already having a large legal immigrant population. This phenomenon is usually explained in
cultural and linguistic terms, but here we oﬀer a purely economic explanation for it.
3 Policy experiments
In this section we experiment with external and internal enforcement policy. Begin with external enforce-
ment. Tighter border control increases the probability φ of apprehension at the border. Diﬀerentiating (18)
shows the eﬀect on the job-finding rate s:
∂s
∂φ =
2yb(r + δ)(r + λ+ δ)
[(1− φ)y − b(r + δ)]2 > 0. (20)
Intuitively, tighter border control makes entry into the destination more diﬃcult, reducing the number of
unemployed immigrants and raising the job-finding rate s. By (8) and (11), an increase in s implies higher
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wages wn and wm, decreasing the firm values Jn and Jm. Thus, external enforcement policy has the eﬀect
of redistributing income from firm owners to workers of both types. Further, as jobs becomes relatively
plentiful for everyone, the unemployment rates un and um fall by (13) and (14). However, a calculation
shows that ∂(un/um)/∂s < 0, i.e., the unemployment rate falls more for natives than for immigrants. This
is just the consequence of the fact that immigrants initially faced a higher rate of unemployment; see in
Proposition 2. Finally, using (3), (4), (5) and (15), we can show that ∂Lm/∂φ < 0; stronger border controls
reduce an immigrant population in the destination country.20
We summarize these findings in
Proposition 4 An increase in φ (tighter border control) has the following results.
(A) The wages increase for both natives and immigrants.
(B) The unemployment rate falls for both types of workers but relatively more for natives
than for immigrants.
(C) The values of firms employing workers of either type fall.
(D) The number of immigrants residing in the destination country declines.
In sum, tighter border control benefits native workers, as they can find jobs in greater numbers at higher
wages. Rising wages decrease firm values and redistributes income from firm owners to workers. Interest-
ingly, since their wage rises and unemployment rate falls, immigrants residing in the destination country
also benefit from tighter border control.21
20See Appendix A for the proof.
21Some authors have empirically investigated the eﬀect of immigration on wages in the destination country. However, empirical
results are mixed. For example, Hanson et al. (2002) and Card (2005) argue that the eﬀects are negligibly small in the U.S.
On the other hand, Borjas (2003) finds a significant negative wage eﬀect. In more recent studies, D’Amuri et al. (2010) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) report that new immigrants cast negative eﬀects on previous immigrants’ wages. It is to be noted,
however, that empirical work does not usually distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants; an exception is Hanson et al.
(2002).
14
The eﬀect of internal enforcement policy is similarly derived. Diﬀerentiating (18) yields
∂s
∂δ =
2b
n
(1− φ)y [2 (r + δ) + λ]− b (r + δ)2
o
[(1− φ)y − b(r + δ)]2 (21)
>
2b (r + δ) [(1− φ)y − b (r + δ)]
[(1− φ)y − b(r + δ)]2
> 0,
where the last inequality comes from Assumption 1. This, by (8), implies a higher wage wn for natives. The
result is similar for an immigrant. Diﬀerentiation of wm (i.e., (11)) yields:
∂wm
∂δ =
b
2(1− φ) > 0.
Higher wages imply lower firm values, as can be verified by diﬀerentiating (19). The unemployment rates
fall: ∂un/∂δ < 0 and ∂um/∂δ < 0, but more for natives than for immigrants since ∂(un/um)/∂δ < 0.
Further, since ∂wm/∂δ > 0, a procedure analogous to the one used for external enforcement shows that
∂α/∂δ < 0 and ∂Lm/∂δ < 0.
Proposition 5 An increase in δ (internal enforcement policy) has the same qualitative eﬀects as an increase
in φ (external enforcement policy) as summarized in (A) through (D) of Proposition 4.
Thus, external and internal enforcement policy are substitutes and can be used jointly to minimize the
enforcement cost, as shown by Ethier (1986).
4 The optimal immigration policy
In this section we examine the nature of optimal immigration policy for the destination country. Before we
proceed, it should be noted that there is no consensus in the literature as to what objective the destination
country government maximizes with respect to immigration policy.22 First, the standard objective of wel-
fare maximization cannot be applied straightforwardly without resolving the question whether to include or
exclude immigrants in the national welfare calculus. Although the literature usually takes an exclusionist
approach, in dynamic contexts immigrants can be naturalized or have oﬀsprings who are natives. In such
cases, it is not obvious how to define national welfare. Second, since restrictive immigration policy redis-
tributes income from firm owners to workers, Ethier (1986) points out that income redistribution itself can
22See Ethier (1986) for more on this point.
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be an objective of immigration policy. Third, reducing the unemployment rate for natives may also be the
government’s policy objective.
With no lack of consensus, we are somewhat at liberty to define the policy objective of the destination
country. In this study we suppose that the destination country maximizes the total surplus created by all
the matches involving native workers less the costs of enforcement policy. Excluding the surpluses generated
by “illegal matches” in our objective is not inconsistent with the presence of internal enforcement policy.23
Further, it can be shown that our objective is qualitatively identical to maximizing the employment of
native workers.
To define our objective function, note that each match with a native worker generates the surplus
Jn +Wn − Un. Since there are (1− un)Ln employed native workers, we define the total gross surplus by
Γ ≡ Ln(1− un)(Jn +Wn − Un) = 2Ln(1− un)Jn,
(the equality follows from the fact that Wn−Un = Jn under the Nash bargaining). Substituting for Jn and
un from (13) and (19), we can rewrite Γ as
Γ = 2syLn
(λ+ s)[2 (r + λ) + s] . (22)
Note that Γ does not depend directly on the policy variables.
Turning to enforcement costs, let g(φ) and h(δ) denote the costs of external and internal enforcement
policy, respectively.24 By Assumption 1, g(φ) and h(δ) are defined over the closed intervals [0,φ] and [0, δ¯],
respectively. We assume that g(φ) and h(δ) are convex and increase without bounds over their respective
domains.25
23 In Appendix B, we explore an alternative objective, which include the values of firms employing illegal immigrants. Although
this makes the calculations more tedious, our qualitative results do not change much.
24 It is assumed that g(φ) is independent of the number of immigrants trying to cross the border illegally. This assumption
keeps the analysis simple and can be justified as follows. Suppose that the border has length of 1 and immigrants can enter
any point on it with uniform probability. Then, without border control illegal entry is 100 % successful. Now, assume that
each border patrol agent can secure an interval ² > 0. Then, with z agents, at most the fraction ²z of the border is secured.
Thus, φ = ²z equals the probability of apprehension on the border and hence its cost g(φ) is independent of the number of
immigrants trying to enter the country illegally.
25Alternatively, one can assume that the government faces a budget constraint h(δ)+g(φ) ≤ B, where B is fixed exogenously
and define δ¯ and φ by h(δ¯) = g(φ) = B. In such a case, our results are unaltered as long as we focus on interior solutions.
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Assumption 2: (i) g(φ) and h(δ) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (0, δ¯) and (0,φ), the interiors of
their domains. (ii) g(0) = h(0) = 0, g(φ) = h(δ¯) =∞ and limφ→0 g0 = limδ→0 h0 = 0.26
We now define social welfare by
SW ≡ Γ− g(φ)− h(δ).
The government chooses φ and δ to maximize SW under Assumption 2.27 The optimal external enforcement
policy satisfies the first-order condition:
∂SW
∂φ =
∂Γ
∂s
∂s
∂φ − g
0(φ) = 0,
where
∂Γ
∂s =
2[2λ(r + λ)− s2]yLn
(λ+ s)2 [2(r + λ) + s]2 .
From the preceding section we have ∂s/∂φ > 0. Since g0 > 0, an interior optimum requires that ∂Γ/∂s > 0.
This condition is satisfied if 2λ(r + λ) − s2 > 0. Substituting from (18) for the equilibrium s, we express
this condition as
Assumption 3: 2λ(r + λ) > ©2b ¡r + δ¯¢ (r + δ¯ + λ)/[(1− φ)y − (r + δ¯)]ª2.
Assumption 3 is a suﬃcient condition for ∂Γ/∂s > 0 and is likely to be met if y, output per worker, is
suﬃciently large. The existence of the optimal policy is guaranteed in the next lemma (proved in Appendix
C).
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, (i) SW is strictly concave in φ ∈ [0,φ] and δ ∈ [0, δ¯]. (ii) SW has
the unique interior maximizers (denoted by φ∗ and δ∗).
Then, computation leads to
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-3, ∂φ∗/∂Ln > 0 and ∂δ∗/∂Ln > 0; the larger Ln, the greater is the
destination country’s eﬀort to intercept illegal immigrants internally and externally.
The intuition is straightforward. Note that s in (22) is independent of Ln. Thus, an increase in Ln
raises the gross social surplus multiplicatively at the margin, and hence the first-order optimality condition
26Primes denote derivatives.
27We suppose that the destination country can choose φ and δ without budgetary constraints.
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calls for an appropriate increase in enforcement. As an immediate application of the result, suppose that a
destination country admits more legal immigrants and consequently has a greater “native” work force. Then,
Proposition 6 implies that such a country tends to impose more stringent enforcement policy compared with
a similar country that admits a fewer legal immigrants. This is consistent with the recent shift in some
European countries towards tougher anti-immigration policy.
5 Multiple destination countries
We are finally in a position to consider cases with multiple destination countries. Before proceeding, we
introduce additional assumptions that keep the analysis relatively simple. First, we suppose there are only
two destination countries, indexed by i = 1, 2. Having more destination countries complicates the analysis
without additional insight. However, in Subsection 6.2 we briefly consider a three-country setting. Second,
immigrants face no mobility barriers across destination countries. Third, job search is still localized; to find
a job in any destination country, an immigrant has to be in that country’s unemployment pool. Fourth,
natives do not migrate. This assumption however is relaxed in Subsection 6.1. Under these assumptions we
examine the two geographical cases.
5.1 The common-border case
Begin with the common-border case, in which both destination countries are contiguous with the source
country. Immigrants cross the border where border control is the weaker of the two and settle in the country
that gives them higher welfare. Thus, the eﬀective level of border control for both destination countries
equals φ = min(φ1,φ2), where φi denotes the level of external enforcement policy of country i (= 1, 2).28
Since the values of unemployment Umi for an immigrant are equalized in the two countries in steady state,
the following condition holds in equilibrium
Um1 = Um2 =
b
1− φ . (23)
The equilibrium values of Jmi, Umi and Wmi are determined independently for each country i as in the
baseline model. In particular, an immigrant’s wage in country i is given by
wmi =
y(r + δi + λ+ si)
2 (r + δi + λ) + si ,
28Throughout this section we use the country subscript i to distinguish between the destination countries.
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as in (11). Note that the parameters y, r, and λ are assumed common in two destination countries, whereas
policy variable δi is country-i specific. Therefore, the equilibrium condition is analogous to (17):
siy
(r + δi) [2 (r + δi + λ) + si] =
b
1− φ ,
which determines the job-finding rate si in each country i, given δi and φ; i.e., si = si(φ, δi).29 The
equilibrium values of other variables can be solved as in the baseline model.
Suppose that our two destination countries pursue their immigration policies simultaneously and inde-
pendently. Then, country i chooses the policy vector (φi, δi), given country j’s policy choice (φj , δj), to
maximize its welfare
SWi = Γi − g(φi)− h(δi),
subject to the constraint φ = min(φ1,φ2). Recall that country i’s gross welfare
Γi = 2Jni(1− uni)Lni. (24)
depends on the policy vector indirectly through si; that is Γi = Γi(si(φ, δi)). Therefore, given φ, each
country’s welfare depends on its internal enforcement policy δi but is independent of the other destination
country’s internal enforcement policy. Thus, internal enforcement policy has no spillover eﬀects. To under-
stand this result intuitively, suppose that country 1, say, raises δ1 for given δ2. Since (23) holds in steady
state, Um2 = b/(1− φ) implies that the equilibrium in country 2 is undisturbed by changes in δ1.30
The independence of internal enforcement policy implies that the first-order condition
∂Γi
∂si
∂si
∂δi − h
0(δi) = 0
determines the optimal δi independently of δj (i 6= j). In other words, each country can implement internal
enforcement policy eﬃciently, given the border policy φ. This makes it possible to solve the model in two
stages; the destination countries first choose φi and then, given φ = min(φ1,φ2), they choose δi. Since the
internal enforcement policy choices are eﬃcient conditional on φ, the remainder of this subsection focuses
on the external enforcement policy game.
29We impose the conditions similar to the one in Assumption 1 to keep si positive.
30The interdependency result stems from our assumption of small destination countries. If destination countries are large,
internal enforcement policies have well-known spillover eﬀects. For example, an increase δ1 reduces the illegal immigrant
population in country 1, which depresses the welfare of being in the source country and results in an increase in immigration
into country 2. Allowing native labor to migrate also gives rise to spillovers; see Subsection 6.1.
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Let φ∗1 denote country 1’s optimal external enforcement policy derived in the baseline model; that is, when
it is the only destination country. In this section we call the φ∗1 country 1’s unconstrained optimum. Then,
country 1’s best-response function, BR1(φ2), is derived as follows. First, if φ2 ≤ φ∗1, then BR1(φ2) = φ2.
To see this, note that raising φ1 above φ2 is costly but has no eﬀect on the flow of immigration into country
1 because all immigrants come through country 2. Lowering φ1 below φ2 can control the flow of immigrants
into country 1’s territory but it is a move away from its unconstrained optimum and hence is welfare
decreasing. This proves the claim. Next, if φ2 > φ∗1, country 1 controls immigration flows at any φ1 < φ2,
and hence it chooses its unconstrained optimum φ∗1. Thus, BR1(φ2) = φ∗1. Country 2’s best-response
function can be derived similarly; namely, BR2(φ1) = φ1 for φ1 ≤ φ∗2 and BR2(φ1) = φ∗2 for φ1 > φ∗2, where
φ∗2 denotes country 2’s unconstrained optimum external enforcement level.
Suppose that two destination countries are symmetric (i.e., Ln1 = Ln2 = Ln). Then, φ∗1 = φ∗2 = φ∗ and
hence the two countries’ best-response functions are also symmetric as shown in Figure 2, where φ1 is on
the horizontal axis and φ2 on the vertical axis.
[Figure 2 around here]
Country 1’s best-response function BR1 comprises the segment 0A of the 45-degree line and the vertical
line at point A= (φ∗,φ∗). Similarly, BR2 comprises the segment 0A and the horizontal line at point
A. Therefore, any point on the segment 0A is a Nash equilibrium. Although there is a continuum of
Nash equilibria, the game is supermodular, so all the equilibria are uniquely welfare-ranked, with point
A representing the Pareto-dominant one. It is evident that this Pareto-dominant equilibrium corresponds
to the unconstrained optimal policy vector (φ∗i , δ∗i ). It is also straightforward to show that the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium maximizes the joint welfare SW1 + SW2. As noted by Giordani and Ruta (2013),
if the equilibrium is not at A, both countries have the incentive to move jointly to point A. Thus, with
symmetric countries, there may be coordination failures but no policy conflict. The next proposition restates
what we have found so far.
Proposition 7 (i) The common-border case with symmetric destination countries has a continuum of
equilibria in external enforcement policy, which includes the one that maximizes the joint welfare of the two
destination countries; (ii) in all other equilibria, each country’s external enforcement level is too low relative
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to the jointly optimum level, (iii) the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is uniquely determined and
eﬃciently (given φ).
The above results change dramatically when destination countries are asymmetric. To illustrate this
point, assume Ln1 > Ln2. Then, Proposition 6 implies that φ∗1 > φ∗2; the larger country (country 1) prefers
tighter border control. This makes the best-response functions asymmetric as shown in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 around here]
In Figure 3, BR1 comprises the segment 0B of the 45-degree line and the vertical line at point B. BR2 is
the same as in Figure 2. Thus, the equilibrium set is the same as in the symmetry case, comprising all the
points on the segment 0A, with point A still representing the Pareto-dominant one. Hence, in equilibrium
both countries choose the common policy level. In particular, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium at point A
implements the unconstrained optimum policy for country 2. However, for country 1 it is too low relative to
its unconstrained optimum level, which is at point B. Thus, if destination countries are asymmetric, there
necessarily arises policy conflict as regards external enforcement policy.
Further, if both countries raise the level of external enforcement slightly above the equilibrium level
φ∗2, there is no first-order welfare loss for country 2 but country 1 welfare increases. Clearly, there is no
Nash equilibrium that maximizes the joint welfare. To further explore this point, consider the joint welfare
maximization problem:
maxφ1,φ2,φ
SW1 + SW2
s.t. φ1 = φ2 = φ.
The objective function is concave under Assumption 3 and diﬀerentiable. The first-order condition is½∂Γ1
∂s1
∂s1
∂φ − g
0(φ)
¾
+
½∂Γ2
∂s2
∂s2
∂φ − g
0(φ)
¾
= 0.
Let φJ denote the jointly optimal external enforcement policy. Evaluated at φ = φ∗1 > φ∗2 the first expression
in braces on the left-hand side vanishes while the second is negative since country 2 is smaller. Thus,
φJ < φ∗1. At φ = φ∗2, the second expression vanishes while the first is positive. Thus, φJ > φ∗2. Therefore,
φJ ∈ (φ∗2,φ∗1); the jointly optimal policy φJ lies in the interior of line segment AB in Figure 3. Thus,
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with size asymmetry, the destination countries face both coordination failures (when the equilibrium is not
Pareto-dominant) and policy conflict (when the equilibrium is Pareto-dominant). We have established the
following results.
Proposition 8 In the common-border case with asymmetric destination countries:
(A) There is a continuum of Nash equilibria.
(B) The Pareto-dominant external enforcement level coincides with the smaller country’s
unconstrained optimum level but is lower than the larger country’s unconstrained optimum level.
(C) The jointly optimal external enforcement level is higher than the smaller country’s
unconstrained optimum level but lower than the larger country’s.
Suppose next that the two destination countries agree to create, and delegate external enforcement to,
a federal or supranational government, whose task is to maximize the joint welfare. Then, a supranational
government sets φi = φJ and must devise a lump-sum tax scheme ti for each country to defray the cost
of enforcement. We consider how the tax burden should be distributed between the two countries. When
countries are symmetric, simply setting ti = g(φJ), i = 1, 2 suﬃces. That is, tax rates should be equalized.
When countries are asymmetric, however, taxes cannot remain equalized because country 2, the smaller of
the two, would refuse to delegate external enforcement policy to the supranational government. In fact, we
show, in Appendix D, that bt1 > bt2, i.e., the larger country needs to bear a greater share of the enforcement
cost than the smaller country so as to keep country 2 indiﬀerent between the jointly optimal external
enforcement policy and the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium policy. A tax scheme that makes country 2
better oﬀ increases the tax burden for the larger country.
Proposition 9 Asymmetric destination countries can attain the jointly optimum external enforcement level
by creating and delegating external enforcement policy to a supranational government only under a tax
scheme that assigns a greater share of the enforcement cost to the lager country.
We next consider a second-best situation. The question is whether, in the absence of a supranational
government, it is possible to delegate control of the two borders to one country without side payments and,
if so, which country should be assigned the responsibility. The responsible country i chooses φ to maximize
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Γi − 2g(φ) as it controls the two borders. The first-order condition is
∂Γi/∂φ− 2g0(φ) = 0.
Let φDi satisfy this first-order condition of this delegation problem. It is evident that φDi < φ∗i since now
country i incurs the cost of patrolling both borders. It is also obvious that φDi < φJ because country i is not
concerned about the other country’s welfare. Also, since ∂Γi/∂φ is increasing in Li, we have φD1 > φD2 . The
last result implies that the joint net surplus is greater if border control is delegated to the larger country
than to the small country.
Now, suppose that the initial Nash equilibrium is the Pareto-dominant one (φ∗2) at point A. Then,
φD2 < φ∗2, so delegating border control to country 2 cannot improve the joint welfare. On the other hand,
delegation to country 1 can increase the joint net welfare, if and only if φD1 > φ∗2, which requires that
country 1 be suﬃciently large; otherwise, delegation of external enforcement to an individual country will
not succeed. By contrast, if the initial Nash equilibrium is not the Pareto-dominant outcome, even delegation
to the smaller country 2 may increase the joint net welfare if (and only if) φD2 > φN .
Proposition 10 In the absence of a supranational government, (i) delegating border control to the larger
country yields greater joint welfare than doing so to the smaller country, and (ii) in the presence of sub-
stantial asymmetries, each country can benefit from delegation of border control to the large country.
5.2 The single-border case
We now turn to the single-border case. Assume without loss of generality that only country 1 is contiguous
with the source country so immigrants must travel through country 1 to reach country 2. Then, only country
1 can enforce border control, so in equilibrium
Um1 =
b
1− φ1 .
Since immigrants can move freely between countries 1 and 2, Um1 = Um2 also holds in equilibrium. There-
fore,
Um1 = Um2 =
b
1− φ1 .
In the present case, country 1 maximizes SW1 = Γ1 − g(φ1)− h(δ1) with respect to φ1 and δ1 whereas
country 2 maximizes SWE2 = Γ2 − h(δ2) with respect to δ2, given φ1. Given concavity of the welfare
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functions, this game has a unique equilibrium, in which country 1 implements its unconstrained optimum
policy vector, namely (φ∗1, δ∗1), while country 2’s internal enforcement policy is eﬃcient, given φ∗1. Note that
this result does not depend on the relative size of the destination countries.
Proposition 11 In the single-border case, the border country implements its external and internal en-
forcement policy at the unconstrained optimal levels, while the non-border country implements its internal
enforcement policy eﬃciently, given the former’s border policy.
While the two countries’ equilibrium policy levels are eﬃcient from an individual point of view, they do
not maximize joint welfare. To show it, consider maximization of the jointly optimal policy:
SW1 + SW
E
2 = Γ1 + Γ2 − g(φ1)− h(δ1)− h(δ2).
The optimal external enforcement policy satisfies the first-order condition:
∂Γ1
∂s1
∂s1
∂φ1 − g
0(φ1) + ∂Γ2∂s2
∂s2
∂φ2
¯¯¯¯
φ2=φ1
= 0.
Given the concavity of the objective function, there is a unique jointly optimum external enforcement policy,
φ˜J .
When evaluated at the equilibrium policy φ∗1, the first two terms on the left-hand side of the first-order
condition vanish but the last term is positive. That is, the joint welfare is increasing at the equilibrium
policy choice (φ1 = φ∗1), implying that φ˜J > φ∗1; country 1’s external enforcement policy is too low for a
joint optimum.
Proposition 12 In the single-border case, the jointly optimal external enforcement level exceeds the Nash
equilibrium level.
Proposition 12 has the standard externality-based explanation: when implementing external enforcement
policy, the border country does not take into account the impact of its policy on the other country’s surplus,
and hence the equilibrium external enforcement is below the joint optimum. This result holds independently
of the relative size of the two countries.
We now turn to the question of how to allocate the border enforcement cost between the two countries
for the joint optimum. Since φ˜J > φ∗1, we have Γ1(φ˜J) > Γ1(φ∗1). That is, the jointly optimum border control
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policy raises country 1’s gross surplus. However, it also means a greater enforcement cost. Therefore, it is
necessary to tax country 2 to defray the enforcement cost for country 1. To be more specific, there exists φ˜
satisfying Γ1(φ˜J)−g(φ˜) = Γ1(φ∗1)−g(φ∗1). That is, φ˜ makes country 1 indiﬀerent between the jointly optimal
policy and the Nash equilibrium policy. Then, taxing countries 1 and 2 at the rates et1 = g(φ˜) > g(φ∗1) andet2 = g(φ˜J)−g(φ˜) > 0, respectively, yields the joint optimum, while keeping country 1 indiﬀerent. If country
1 is to be made strictly better oﬀ, country 2 would have to bear a greater tax burden than et2.
Proposition 13 Delegating external enforcement policy to a supranational government attains the joint
optimum, which dominates the Nash equilibrium in the Pareto sense, if the two countries are taxed at the
rate et1 and et2 defined above.
Finally, supposing there is no supranational authority, consider delegation of border control to country
2 without side payments. The argument we used to obtain Proposition 12 can be employed to show that
φ˜J > φ∗2 and hence φ˜J > max(φ∗1,φ∗2); the jointly optimal border control level exceeds each country’s
unconstrained optimum. Therefore, the joint surplus function Γ1(φ)+Γ2(φ)− g(φ) is increasing at φ < φ˜J .
Then, since a larger country would choose a higher border control level in equilibrium, delegation of external
enforcement to a larger country yields greater joint welfare.
Proposition 14 In the single-border case, absent the supranational government, delegation of border en-
forcement policy to the larger country yields a greater joint net surplus.
6 Extensions
This section presents three extensions. The first extension relaxes the assumption that native workers do
not migrate to the other destination country. The second extension combines the two prototypal cases
in a model with three destination countries. The third extension considers general cases of inter-country
asymmetry and shows that policy conflicts arises from the presence of any such asymmetry.
6.1 Mobile native workers
In this subsection we relax the assumption that natives do not migrate between destination countries. Since
the basic model is linear in the size of the native population, mobility of native workers results either in
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indeterminacy of their distribution between two destination countries or in corner solutions (all natives move
to one country). To avoid such undesirable consequences, assume that natives attach extra utility values
a > 0 to staying in their native countries. Assume that a is drawn independently for each native worker
from common distribution F (a), with continuous and positive density f(a) = dF (a) over positive support.
With this modification, the asset-value equations for native workers staying in their home countries i are
rewritten as
rUni = a+ s(Wni − Uni),
rWni = wni + a+ λ(Uni −Wni),
Wni − Uni = wni
r + λ+ si .
Because the values of firms are unaﬀected by native labor mobility, the wage for native workers satisfies (8).
Hence, Uni is expressed as
Uni =
a
r
+
siy
r [2 (r + λ) + si] . (25)
Assuming that native workers move only when they are unemployed, focus on country-two natives.
If some of them move to country 1, the following threshold condition holds for those (i.e., ba2) who are
indiﬀerent between staying in country 2 and migrating to country 1:
Un1|a=0 = Un2|a=a2 . (26)
Substituting, we can rewrite this condition as
s1y
2 (r + λ) + s1 = ba2 + s2y2 (r + λ) + s2 .
The left-hand side represents the welfare from migrating to country 1, while the right-hand side represents
the the welfare from staying in country 2. Thus, all country-two natives with a < ba2 move to country 1
while those with a > ba2 remain in country 2.
Assume that each destination country government counts all the “native” resident workers in its native
labor force, regardless of where they come from. Then, when choosing its enforcement policy, the country-1
government takes its eﬀect on ba2 into consideration (while still taking the wage and job-finding rate in
country 2, wn2 and s2, as given). From (26), we have
∂ba2
∂δ1 = r
∂Un1
∂s1
∂s1
∂δ1 > 0,
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and hence a stronger internal enforcement policy in country 1 increases that country’s native labor force by
∂Ln1
∂δ1 = F
0(ba2)(1− un2)Ln2∂ba2∂δ1 > 0.
Similar arguments hold for country 2.
By Equation (24) country i’s welfare increases in Lni, implying that both countries prefer to have
a greater native labor force. More specifically, we know from (21) that an increase in δi raises Uni, so
two governments compete to attract native workers from each other with stronger internal enforcement.
However, there cannot be two-way native migration in equilibrium.31 Thus, only two types of equilibria are
conceivable. In one, there is no migration of native labor but internal enforcement levels are set higher than
in the analysis of Section 5 to keep each other’s native worker from leaving. In the other equilibrium, there
is one-way immigration; say, there is migration of country 2 workers to country 1, but not the other way
around. In this case, country 1 sets its internal enforcement level suﬃciently higher than country 2 so that
these conditions hold in equilibrium:
s1y
2 (r + λ) + s1 = ba2 + s2y2 (r + λ) + s2 and s2y2 (r + λ) + s2 < a+ s1y2 (r + λ) + s1 ,
where a denotes the minimum of support of F (a). In this case, even if two destination countries are initially
identical in the sizes of their native populations, country 1 becomes the larger of the two. The above analysis
is valid both for the common-border and the single-border case.
Turning to the eﬀect of native mobility on external enforcement, we can show that changes in φi has
similar eﬀects as in δi. Namely, from (26), we obtain
∂ba2
∂φ1 = r
∂Un1
∂s1
∂s1
∂φ1 > 0.
Hence, the country-1 government expects its native labor force to change by
∂Ln1
∂φ1 = F
0(ba2)(1− un2)Ln2 ∂ba2∂φ1 > 0.
Similar results hold for country 2.
Recall, however, that in the common-border case, an uncoordinated increase in φi above the common
rate φ = min{φ1,φ2} has no eﬀect on si. On the other hand, if welfare increases with more stringent border
control, the proceeding argument implies that the set of continuum of Nash equilibria is larger than the one
31Proof is by contradiction. Assuming that (26) and its counterpart for country-one immigrants produces a contradiction.
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given in Section 5. In the single-border case, this consideration prompts the border country to implement
stronger external enforcement than in the analysis of Section 5.
In short, when natives move between two destination countries, the destination country governments
choose higher levels of internal enforcement policy and possibly higher levels of external enforcement, as
well, compared with when natives do not move. In contrast, if two countries delegate immigration to a
supragovernment, the joint optimum is unaﬀected by mobility of natives.
6.2 Three destination countries
Returning to the case of non-migrating native labor, we next extend our analysis to a slightly more com-
plicated geography than in Section 5. Suppose there are two border countries (say, Greece and Italy) and
one non-border country (say, Germany). This extension combines elements from our two prototypal cases.
The equilibrium flows of immigration into all three destinations depend on the weaker of the two border
countries’ external enforcement policy levels. If Germany has no say on Greek and Italian enforcement pol-
icy, we also know that the external enforcement levels are suboptimal to all three countries due to the both
types of externalities highlighted in our two prototypal cases. The suboptimality calls for implementation
of external enforcement policy at a federal (E.U.) level. Failing that, delegating the decision to the largest
country (Germany) can solve the coordination failure problem between Greece and Italy.
6.3 General inter-country asymmetry
When considering inter-country diﬀerences in the preceding analysis, we assumed that two destination
countries had unequal sizes of native populations. In this subsection we consider other types of asymmetries,
and show that any asymmetry can result in conflict in external enforcement policy. Let x denote a parameter
representing an asymmetry. A destination country’s objective function is now written Γ(s(φ, x), x)− g(φ).
Its optimal external enforcement policy is given by
∂Γ(s(φ, x), x)
∂s
∂s(φ, x)
∂φ − g
0(φ) = 0. (27)
If x aﬀects the first term on the left, there is policy conflict between destination countries. For example,
if x raises the first term, a country having a higher x prefers more stringent external enforcement than a
country having a lower x, other things being equal. When x = Ln, the analysis is particular simple, since
28
Γ(s(φ, x), x) = Γ(s(φ))Ln so the first term in (27) is linear in Ln.
As an example of alternative inter-country asymmetry, suppose there is a sizable diﬀerence in produc-
tivity between two destination countries. This can be interpreted in two ways. If productivity diﬀerences
are agent-independent, the derivative of the first term of (27) with respect to y may not be positive for all
relevant values, although it is positive if the curvature of Γ with respect to s (i.e., − ¡∂2Γ/∂s2¢ / (∂Γ/∂s))
is suﬃciently large.32 That is, if this condition holds, a more productive country prefers more stringent
external enforcement than a less productive one. On the other hand, suppose that productivity diﬀerences
refer only to native labor, that is, a native worker is more productive, say, in country 1 than one in country
2, while immigrants’ productivity ym is identical regardless of where they work. In this case, the first-term
of (27) becomes (∂Γ(s(φ, ym), yn)/∂s)(∂s(s(φ, ym)/∂φ); i.e., s is again independent of native labor produc-
tivity yn and it can be shown that a country with more productive native labor prefers more stringency in
external enforcement policy than a country with less productive native labor. In either case, we have policy
conflict in the way we described in Section 5.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the eﬀect of external and internal enforcement policy to combat illegal immigration
in the presence of unemployment. Our analysis extends the literature on illegal immigration that started
with Ethier (1986) on two separate fronts. First, our model is based on search-theoretic unemployment,
while the literature typically assumed unemployment due to wage rigidity. Second, we extend the literature
to cases of multiple destination countries and examine both policy conflict and policy coordination problems
they face.
Assuming there are two destination countries, we consider two prototypal geographic cases. In the
common-border case, both destination are contiguous with the source country so that immigrants cross the
border where external enforcement is the weaker and settle in their preferred destinations. In such a case,
unless destinations are symmetric, there is at least one country that prefers tighter border control than the
equilibrium level, thereby giving rise to policy conflict. In the single-border case, where only one destination
is contiguous with the source country, the border country implements its unconstrained optimum policy (as
32The proof is given in Appendix E.
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in the baseline single-destination model) while the other country implements its internal enforcement policy
eﬃciently. Although the equilibrium policies are eﬃcient from a single-country point of view, however, the
equilibrium external enforcement is too low relative to the joint optimum because the border country does
not take into account the eﬀect of its policy on the non-border country. Although policy conflict occurs
with respect to external enforcement policy, in both cases internal enforcement is always implemented
eﬃciently and hence gives rise to no policy conflict. Thus, our analysis has the clear policy implication:
external enforcement policy should best be handled by the federal or supranational government, but the
implementation of internal enforcement should be left up to each destination country’s discretion.
We then analyze two follow-up questions. One is how the supranational government should allocate its
external enforcement cost between the destination countries. Another is whether to delegate border control
to one country, if there is no such supranational authority to enforce border control. With respect to the
first question, we find that the joint optimum requires the larger country to bear a greater tax burden for
border control. With respect to the second, we find that delegating border control to the larger country
increases joint welfare. These results hold both in the common-border and single-border cases.
Several extensions manifest themselves. Firstly, our approach to modeling equilibrium unemployment
was minimalist. We can incorporate richer features into our analysis to examine issues not considered in this
paper; e.g., unemployment benefits, public goods provisions, possibility of amnesty, etc. A more challenging
extension is introduction of capital and capital mobility between two destination countries. As shown by
Kessler et al. (2002), the properties of policy competition may change if another mobile factor is introduced.
Secondly, we treated native and immigrant labor as homogenous, but this assumption can be relaxed in
a number of ways; for example, natives may be more productive than immigrants (however, we showed
in Subsection 6.3 that this makes no qualitative diﬀerence on our results). Another extension is to treat
native and immigrant labor as complementary to each other. This can make immigration beneficial to the
destination countries; see e.g., Liu (2010). If so, however, there arises a diﬀerent puzzle: why do destination
countries try to stop illegal immigration? We leave such extensions and applications for future research.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of ∂Lm/∂φ < 0
To find the eﬀect on the number of immigrants in the destination country, diﬀerentiate (5) and substitute
from (3) and (4) into the resulting equation to derive
(Jn − Jm) ∂α∂φ +
α
r + λ+ δ
∂wm
∂φ +
1− α
r + λ
∂wm
∂φ =
c
q2
∂q
∂φ . (28)
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Given s0(θ) > 0, ∂s/∂φ > 0 implies ∂θ/∂φ > 0, and hence ∂q/∂φ < 0, given q0(θ) < 0. This makes the
right-hand side of (28) negative. On the left-hand side of the equation, since ∂wi/∂φ > 0, the second and
the third terms are positive. Hence, (28) holds only if the first term on the left-hand side is negative. Since
Jn − Jm > 0 by Proposition 2, we conclude that ∂α/∂φ < 0; i.e., tighter border control (an increase in φ)
decreases the proportion of immigrants in the unemployment pool. Finally, (15) is arranged to yield
Lm =
α
1− α
un
um
Ln.
Since tighter border control lowers the two ratios α/(1− α) and (un/um), the total number of immigrants
in the destination country must fall.
Appendix B: An Alternative Welfare Function
If we include the surplus of firms employing illegal workers, the total (gross) surplus is given by
G ≡ (1− un)Ln(Jn +Wn − Un) + (1− um)LmJm = 2Ln(1− un)Jn + (1− um)LmJm.
Then, substituting for Jn, Jm, un, and um from (13), (14), and (19) yields an extended measure of gross
welfare
G =
2syLn
(λ+ s)[2 (r + λ) + s] +ΘLm,
where Θ is defined as
Θ ≡ rys
(r + δ + s) {r [2 (r + λ) + s] + δ (2r + s)} .
The government now chooses φ and δ to maximize
SW = G− g(φ)− h(δ).
The optimal external enforcement policy satisfies the first-order condition:
∂SW
∂φ =
∂G
∂φ − g
0(φ) = 0,
and the optimal internal enforcement policy satisfies the first-order condition:
∂SW
∂δ =
∂G
∂δ − h
0(δ) = 0.
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Note that the first term of G is a function of s only but the second term is not. Hence, the policy eﬀects
on G becomes somewhat complicated:
∂G
∂φ =
2[2λ(r + λ)− s2]yLn
(λ+ s)2 [2(r + λ) + s]2
∂s
∂φ
+
ry(r + δ) £2r(r + δ + λ)− s2¤Lm
(r + δ + s)2 {2r2 + δs+ r [2(δ + λ) + s]}2
∂s
∂φ +Θ
∂Lm
∂φ ,
∂G
∂δ =
2[2λ(r + λ)− s2]yLn
(λ+ s)2 [2(r + λ) + s]2
∂s
∂δ
+
ry(r + δ) £2r(r + δ + λ)− s2¤Lm
(r + δ + s)2 {2r2 + δs+ r [2(δ + λ) + s]}2
∂s
∂δ
− rsy
¡
4r2 + 2r(2δ + λ+ 2s) + s(2δ + s)¢Lm
(δ + r + s)2 (2r2 + r(2(δ + λ) + s) + δs)2 +Θ
∂Lm
∂δ .
The first terms of the above two equations are the same as in the case described in the main text, while the
other terms capture the eﬀect through changes in the surpluses accruing to illegitimate firms. Especially,
the last terms represent the losses form decreasing illegitimate employment. If such losses dominate the
other eﬀects, governments have no incentive to conduct enforcement policies. If not, governments exert
enforcement policies, which is the focus of our paper. In such a case, we can conduct the same analysis as
the one described in the main text.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 1
We have ∂s/∂φ > 0 and
∂2s
∂φ2 =
4y2b (r + δ) (r + δ + λ)
[(1− φ)y − (r + δ)]3 > 0,
Thus, s(φ) is convex and strictly increasing and hence invertible. Since Γ depends on s but not directly
on the policy variables, we can write the objective function as Γ(s) − g(φ(s)). Maximizing the latter with
respect to s yields the first-order condition
Γ0(s)− g0(φ(s))φ0(s) = 0,
where
Γ0(s) = 2[2λ(r + λ)− s
2]yLn
(λ+ s)2 [2(r + λ) + s]2 .
The second-order condition requires
Γ”(s)− g”(φ(s))[φ02 − g0(φ(s))φ”(s) < 0
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at the optimum. Here, we know that g0(φ(s)) > 0, g”(φ(s)) > 0, and φ”(s) > 0. Moreover, diﬀerentiation
shows that Γ”(s) < 0 under Assumptions 1 and 2. Thus, the second-order condition holds globally. Finally,
lims↓0Γ0(s) > 0 implies that s > 0 at the optimum.
Appendix D: Proof of bt1 > bt2
Note first that φJ > φ∗2 implies that Γ2(φJ) − g(φJ) < Γ2(φ∗2) − g(φ∗2) so country 2 is made worse oﬀ
by the policy φJ . However, (20) and Assumption 3 imply that Γi is increasing in φ. Then, Γ2(φJ) −
g(φ∗2) > Γ2(φ∗2) − g(φ∗2). Therefore, there exists φˆ ∈ (φ∗2,φJ) that makes country 2 indiﬀerent in the sense
that Γ2(φJ) − g(φˆ) = Γ2(φ∗2) − g(φ∗2). Hence, if the supranational government imposes lump-sum taxesbt1 = 2g(φJ)− g(φˆ) > 0 and bt2 = g(φˆ) > 0 on countries 1 and 2, respectively,
Γ1(φJ)− bt1 = Γ1(φJ)− ³2g(φJ)− g(φˆ)´
= Γ1(φJ) + Γ2(φJ)− 2g(φJ)− (Γ2(φ∗2)− g(φ∗2))
> Γ1(φ∗2)− g(φ∗2),
where the inequality comes from the property of the joint optimum. Thus, the above tax scheme makes
country 1, the larger country, better oﬀ than in the Nash equilibrium. Since g(φJ) > g(φˆ), we have that
bt1 > bt2.
Appendix E: Inter-country asymmetry in productivity
Replace x with y in the first term on the left of (27) and diﬀerentiate the result with respect to y to obtainµ∂2Γ
∂s2
∂s
∂y +
∂2Γ
∂s∂y
¶ ∂s
∂φ +
∂Γ
∂s
∂2s
∂φ∂y ,
which captures the eﬀect on the marginal value of external enforcement policy from a change in productivity.
From (18) and (20), we obtain
∂s
∂y = −
2b(1− φ)(δ + r)(δ + λ+ r)
[(1− φ)y − b(δ + r)]2 ,
∂2s
∂φ∂y = −
2b(δ + r)(δ + λ+ r) [(1− φ)y + b(δ + r)]
[(1− φ)y − b(δ + r)]3 ,
which, combined with (20) and the properties of Γ, shows that in equilibrium
∂2Γ
∂s2 < 0,
∂s
∂y < 0,
∂2Γ
∂s∂y > 0,
∂s
∂φ > 0,
∂Γ
∂s > 0, and
∂2s
∂φ∂y < 0.
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Hence, the eﬀect of y is positive if
∂2Γ
∂s2
∂s
∂y
∂s
∂φ +
∂Γ
∂s
∂2s
∂φ∂y > 0. (29)
We can use these expressions and (20) to rewrite (29) as
−∂
2Γ/∂s2
∂Γ/∂s >
[(1− φ)y]2 − [b(δ + r)]2
2by(1− φ)(δ + r)(δ + λ+ r) .
37
0 1


*
Iso‐welfare curves
Figure 1. Ranges of       and  
߶∗ ߶ത ߶
߶
0Figure 2. Symmetric destination countries with 
common border
Nash equilibrium
A
1
1
߶∗
߶ത
߶ത
߶ଶ
߶ଵ
߶ଵ ൌ ߶ଶ
ܤܴଵሺ߶ଶሻ
ܤܴଶሺ߶ଵሻ
߶∗
Figure 3. Asymmetric destination countries 
with common border
A
B
1
1
Nash equilibrium
߶௃
߶௃ ߶ଵ∗
߶ଶ∗
߶ത
߶ത
߶ଶ
߶ଵ
߶ଵ ൌ ߶ଶ
ܤܴଵሺ߶ଶሻ
ܤܴଶሺ߶ଵሻ
